Interventions in remote, rural settings face high transaction costs. We develop a model of household decision-making to evaluate how nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) address these implementation-related challenges and influence intervention effectiveness. To test our model's predictions, we create a sample of observationally similar Indian villages that differ in their prior engagement with a local development NGO. In partnership with this NGO, we then stratify a randomized technology-promotion intervention across this institutional variable. We uncover a large and statistically significant "NGO effect"-prior engagement with the NGO increases the effectiveness of our intervention by at least thirty percent. Our results have implications for the generalizability of experimental research conducted jointly with NGOs. In particular, attempts to scale up findings from such work may prove less successful than anticipated if the role of NGOs is insufficiently understood. Alternatively, policymakers looking to scale up could achieve greater success by enlisting trusted local partners.
Introduction
Implementation challenges stymie policies and programs in virtually every sector. Transaction costs borne to identify beneficiaries and service providers, gauge their trustworthiness, bargain to reach consensus, and monitor agreements to ensure they are fulfilled can undermine the effectiveness of interventions-particularly in low-income settings, where such frictions are especially important (Holloway et al., 2000; Ito, 2009; Jack and Suri, 2014; Schaner, 2016) . Where public-service delivery has proven difficult, a variety of non-state, non-market institutions-most notably, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)-have emerged (Werker and Ahmed, 2008) . Indeed, NGOs increasingly play lead roles in implementation on the ground; by some estimates, India alone is home to over three million of them-a figure that outnumbers its public hospitals, schools and police force. 1,2 That they are (at least in theory) nimble and efficient has made them attractive partners for international donors. In 2012, for instance, OECD countries channeled over $17 billion of overseas development assistance to-and through-NGOs (Aldashev and Navarra, 2014) . Private charitable giving to international development NGOs may be considerably higher (Micklewright and Wright, 2003) .
In this study, we develop a model of household decision-making motivated by transaction costs to evaluate how NGOs influence the outcomes of interventions. We then use a novel matchedexperimental study design to test our model's main theoretical claim: that an NGO lowers transaction costs where it has been more active, which in turn increases intervention effectiveness. We test this claim in the context of an an intervention designed to promote improved cookstoves (ICS) among households in rural India. Nearly three billion people globally rely on traditional stoves and solid fuels for their primary energy needs. ICS, which are designed to increase the efficiency of solid-fuel combustion, have long been seen as a potential solution to the environmental-health-development burden these energy-use patterns impose (Jeuland and Pattanayak, 2012) . 3 Yet widespread uptake has proven challenging (e.g., Mobarak et al., 2012) and-as in other arenas-the role played by local institutions in driving adoption remains poorly understood despite considerable scholarship on what encourages uptake (Lewis and Pattanayak, 2012) .
We first use ex ante propensity score matching to create a sample of observationally similar villages that are differentiated by prior exposure to a local development NGO. In partnership with this NGO, we then randomly assign nearly 100 geographically distinct hamlets within these villages (covering a sample of almost 1,000 households) to treatment and control groups as part of an experimental ICS-promotion intervention. Our results suggest that the intervention increases adoption: nearly half of all households targeted by the promotion campaign purchased an ICS. However, our study design 1 Anand, U. (2015): "India has 31 lakh NGOs, more than double the number of schools," The Indian Express. August 1. http://bit.ly/2pqeKti.
2 In contrast, the total number of international NGOs is more conservatively estimated to be closer to 30,000 (Aldashev and Navarra, 2014) .
3 Reliance on traditional fuels and stoves imposes a tremendous burden on household health (via exposure to household air pollution); local forests (via unsustainable extraction of fuelwood); and the global climate (due to widespread biomass burning). Bailis et al. (2015) , Jeuland and Pattanayak (2012) , Jeuland et al. (2015) , and Venkataraman (2005) provide an overview of the global nature and magnitude of this environmental, health, and welfare burden. also allows us to identify the direct impact of the NGO on ICS adoption and energy-use patterns.
We uncover a large and statistically significant "NGO effect"-purchase rates are nearly thirteen percentage points (28 percent) higher in treated communities with prior interactions with the NGO.
This finding is robust to multiple ways of defining the scope of the NGO's prior relationships with communities. Placebo tests inspired by randomization-based inferential procedures also reveal that it is highly unlikely to have been the result of the chance selection of the set of villages in our sample.
Using a triple-differences specification-which further relaxes our identifying assumptions-we find that treated households in NGO communities are also sixteen percentage points more likely to use intervention stoves than treated households in communities without a prior relationship with the NGO, representing a fifty percent increase in the size of the treatment effect. Consistent with these patterns of adoption and use, treated households in NGO communities exhibit significant reductions in the use of solid fuels and in fuel-collection times. In contrast, we find no evidence of similar improvements in energy-use patterns for treated households in non-NGO communities. Our stratified study design, therefore, reveals that we would have considerably overestimated the effectiveness of our intervention had it been a typical randomized evaluation conducted in partnership with the NGO.
Our findings highlight some of the implications of the increasing roles NGOs play as partners in research, especially in recent years in response to a growing refrain for more "evidence-based" policies (Banerjee et al., 2007 (Banerjee et al., , 2017 . Charity evaluators (such as GiveWell and Giving What We Can) routinely release lists of top NGOs whose effectiveness is rigorously evaluated for would-be donors in search of causes. In the fiercely competitive world of fundraising, such signals do not go unnoticed, and NGOs are often keen to work with researchers and have the impacts of their programs assessed.
For applied researchers, partnerships with NGOs provide ready access to target populations, local expertise, and human resources and operational infrastructure. These lower costs of doing research, and create opportunities for researchers to test new theories directly. Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in developing countries have particularly benefited from these trends. Indeed, proponents argue that "many of the best RCTs have come from long-term partnerships between researchers and NGOs or other local partners." 4 NGO-researcher collaborations undoubtedly yield valuable insights about the effectiveness of environmental, health, and development interventions (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2015; Brooks et al., 2016; Jayachandran et al., 2017; Miguel and Kremer, 2004) . That said, we show that this seemingly symbiotic relationship may also mask the unique roles NGOs often play in remote, rural settings-with serious implications for the generalizability and scalability of solutions deemed effective in applied research (Berge et al., 2012; Peters et al., 2018; Vivalt, 2017) .
More broadly, our study is motivated by calls for research that sheds light on how and why certain interventions are effective, not simply whether or not they are (Deaton, 2010; Pattanayak et al., 2017; Rosenthal et al., 2017) . In particular, we demonstrate how solutions from applied research that is tied to the places, populations, and programs associated with specific NGOs may have very different impacts when implemented in alternative settings (Ravallion, 2009) . 5 Our study is also related to a growing literature on the role of implementer identity, which finds that NGO-led interventions are generally more effective than comparable efforts by other actors (Bold et al., 2016; Cameron and Shah, 2017; Grossman et al., 2016; Henderson and Lee, 2015 ). Yet such comparisons implicitly assume that there is something inherently different about NGOs that leads to implementation effectiveness. As we show, this is not necessarily the case, and even heretofore "effective" NGOs struggle to overcome implementation-related barriers when forced to operate in new settings where their stock of social capital is low. This is because effective local NGOs often spend years fostering trust in the communities where they operate. These typically unobserved context-and NGO-specific characteristics interact with aspects of the intervention, influence transaction costs associated with implementation, and ultimately help determine final outcomes. 6 Nevertheless, we recognize that ours is not the only study grappling with these questions, and that there are tangible opportunities for us to incorporate lessons from this broader literature on the importance of implementer identity. To evaluate the relative strength of the evidence we uncover, we use estimates from Bold et al. (2016) and Cameron and Shah (2017) -who compare the effectiveness of an NGO-led intervention to a government-led one-to formally specify a distribution for our prior understanding of the effects NGOs might have on final outcomes. How does our study contribute to this prior knowledge? To answer this question, we use this prior distribution as a critical component of a multilevel Bayesian analysis, with which we revisit our main results. We show that a synthesis of existing insights and our results in this way yields posterior distributions of the magnitude of the "NGO effect" that are considerably more precise. Importantly, we demonstrate that our results overwhelmingly point to the direction of this effect being positive. This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we develop our theoretical model of household decision-making in the presence of NGOs and transaction costs; Section 3 provides an overview of our data and sample-selection methods; Section 4 outlines our empirical framework and identification strategy; Section 5 presents results; Section 6 demonstrates how insights from the related literature inform our results within a Bayesian framework; and Section 7 concludes.
2 NGOs, transaction costs, and household decision-making Transaction costs are inherent in the adoption of new technologies-especially in remote, rural settings characterized by low information (Bernard et al., 2017; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010; Suri, 2011) . For example, while the material costs of new technologies are usually borne immediately, 5 This is often referred to as "site selection bias" (Allcott, 2015) and can arise in at least two different ways. First, as Lin et al. (2012) show in the context of forestry interventions, the spatial distribution of social-welfare programs is non-random. The presence of such programs for the purposes of evaluation is correlated with past levels of NGO activity, which is itself strategically determined by NGOs (Brass, 2012; Fruttero and Gauri, 2005; MacLean et al., 2015) . Second, NGOs capable of managing complex RCTs (designed to provide evidence of program effectiveness) are also likely to implement programs more effectively than the average implementer.
6 For instance, if beneficiaries are unsure about the benefits and costs associated with unfamiliar welfare-improving technologies (such as ICS), trusted NGOs can leverage these relationships to reduce households' perceptions of the risks associated with technology adoption. benefits are often uncertain and realized far in the future; resources are thus required to learn about the valuable attributes of the technology, and gauge the full extent of its costs and benefits. In addition, the search and exchange process that technology adoption entails can impose significant costs. These are often related to the size of the market. Relatively large markets-such as major urban areas-feature a multitude of retailers and suppliers, competing along technology price, quality, and differentiability criteria. In contrast, relatively small markets-such as remote, rural settings-are characterized by weak supply chains, a paucity of suppliers, and limited options. These institutional characteristics influence households' decisions about technology adoption, particularly in smaller markets where kinship ties, reciprocal exchange, and repeated dealings (in other words, social capital) are more salient (Kranton, 1996) .
These insights motivate our model of household decision-making. Drawing on Jeuland et al. (2015) -who in turn build on more fundamental work in environmental and health economics (Grossman, 1972; Pattanayak and Pfaff, 2009 )-we develop a model in which households decide whether to invest in technologies that avert environmental health risks (such as ICS). These decisions necessarily involve a trade-off with consumption of other goods and leisure: households must maximize utility by allocating limited resources to environmental or health investments, consumption, and leisure. Accordingly, household utility (u) is a function of consumption (c), leisure (l), technology adoption (a), time spent sick (s), and household environmental quality (e). Sickness is determined by household environmental quality, which is itself determined by the household's adoption decisions.
The household's utility function is assumed to be twice differentiable, continuous, and concave.
The household faces a "full income" constraint, whereby its exogenous income (y) must be allocated to consumption (c) as well as the materials (m), time (t) and knowledge (k)-with prices p, w and r, respectively-required for technology adoption. Similarly, total available time (T ) must be allocated to leisure, time spent sick, and time allocated to the technology-adoption decision.
The Lagrangian associated with the household's optimization problem is as follows:
Note that the material and time costs associated with the technology adoption are presented in Equation (1) as a function of the activities of an NGO, denoted by ξ. 7 In addition, while NGO activity is relatively less likely to influence the price of time (the local market wage rate), it can influence the amount of time a household needs to allocate to the technology adoption decision; accordingly, t is also a function of ξ.
The first-order conditions associated with the maximization problem outlined in Equation (1) 7 Most fundamentally, differences in NGO activity arise because NGOs are present in certain locations and not in others. However, such differences may also arise due to the amount of time an NGO has been active in a particular community, or due to the nature and intensity of the programs it chooses to implement there. are as follows:
L t = u a a t(ξ) + u s s e e a a t(ξ) + u e e a a t(ξ) − λw 1 + s e e a a t(ξ) − µ = 0
L m = u a a m + u s s e e a a m + u e e a a m − λ (p (ξ) + ws e e a a m ) − µ = 0 (6)
Assuming that all individuals work some nonzero hours, it follows from Equation (9) that µ = 0.
Then, from Equation (2), the optimal level of technology adoption (a * ) must fulfill u a + u s s e e a + u e e a λ − ws e e a
Marginal benefit, M B(a)
The first term on the left-hand side of Equation (10) represents the monetary value of the change in utility arising from marginal investments in welfare-improving technologies; the second term is the opportunity cost of sickness valued at the price of time (the wage rate, w). The right-hand side represents the marginal cost of investing in an additional unit of a, disaggregated by the costs associated with materials, knowledge, and time commitment necessary for technology adoption.
Let π (a, ξ) represent household welfare (or net benefit). Then:
where Equation (12) follows from the concavity of the household's utility function.
We further assume that:
For the intuition behind the identities outlined in Equations (13), (14) and (15) Given these conditions, we can evaluate how NGO activity influences technology adoption directly using the implicit-function theorem as follows:
The numerator in Equation (17) is positive. This follows from Equations (13), (14) and (15), which imply that the marginal cost of technology adoption is decreasing in ξ. The negative sign of the denominator is established in Equation (12), implying that the sign of the expression in Equation (17) is positive. In other words, the welfare-maximizing level of technology adoption increases with an increase in NGO activity, all else constant. 9
Our model thus yields a tractable definition of the transaction costs associated with technology 8 It is worth noting settings where these assumptions might not hold. For instance, while an NGO's positive reputation may increase the willingness of beneficiaries to adopt solutions suggested by it, its assessment of its own "reputation risks" (Herman et al., 2003) could lead it to restrict the set of interventions it chooses to implement. Indeed, our local implementation partner expressed reservations about implementing a potentially welfare-improving ICS-promotion intervention in the study setting, highlighting in particular the reputation risks the NGO faced should ICS-promotion activities related to our study (described in Section 4.1) be received poorly by its beneficiaries. In addition, while our implementing partner lobbied during the design phase for reductions in the baseline price of ICS that its beneficiaries would ultimately face, it is not difficult to imagine a rent-seeking NGO behaving very differently. Needless to say, there are a variety of organizations active in remote, rural settings and we do not intend to insinuate that our model provides general principles for how these actors will behave under all conditions.
9 The implicit-function theorem cannot be used to evaluate the impact of discrete changes in NGO activity. One may be interested, for instance, in how an NGO's decision to begin operating in a community where it had not previously affects households' avoidance behavior. To see the effects of such a change, note that an increase in ξ from ξ to ξ * causes a discrete reduction in marginal cost of avoidance behavior, analogous to the continuous case. Under this condition, household welfare exhibits increasing marginal returns to ξ, as demonstrated below:
Let arg max π (a, ξ ) = a and arg max π (a, ξ * ) = a * . Then a * > a by the strict-monotonicity theorem (Edlin and Shannon, 1998). adoption: the opportunity costs of allocating time, materials, and knowledge to the adoption process.
In structuring risks and variability, fostering collective action, and influencing existing practices, NGOs influence the set of costs associated with investments in welfare-improving technologies-and, indeed, in participating in environmental, health and development interventions more broadly. Recent work has looked at the roles NGOs play in enhancing monitoring and enforcement (Aldashev et al., 2015; Grant and Grooms, 2017) ; improving public-service delivery (Devarajan et al., 2013) ; and working with heterogeneous beneficiaries (Bengtsson, 2013) . Outside of a nascent stream of research on the strategic nature of NGOs' location decisions (Brass, 2012; Fruttero and Gauri, 2005; MacLean et al., 2015) , however, little is known about the roles that they might play in directly determining the outcomes of applied interventions. Indeed, while some have noted the presence of differential impacts across communities with and without NGO activity (e.g., Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013; Sharma et al., 2015) , to the best of our knowledge, no study has rigorously examined how the presence of an effective local NGO and the specific institutional context that represents might directly influence household decision-making. In contrast, our model provides a clear, empirically testable hypothesis:
where NGO activity has been higher, intervention effectiveness-in our case, in the form of uptake of ICS technologies-will also be higher. The remainder of this paper turns to an empirical evaluation of this claim.
Data and descriptive statistics
Our sampling frame consists of over 1,000 households across 97 geographically distinct hamlets (toks) located in 38 Census-delineated villages (gram panchayats) in the northern Indian state of Uttarakhand. In this section we (i) describe the creation of observationally equivalent groups of these 38 NGO and non-NGO villages using ex ante propensity score matching; (ii) outline the random selection of households in hamlets located within these villages; and (iii) present descriptive statistics for our full sample of households.
3.1 Creation of the sample using propensity score matching Given our interest in the influence of community-level institutional factors-as well as the fact that interventions are often initiated at the community level-we developed a sampling strategy designed to minimize the risk associated with community-level confounders influencing our analysis. Specifically, our strategy for the pre-baseline selection of communities (and distribution of households across these communities) relied on a matched-experimental design that sought to ensure sufficient variation to create the contextual strata of interest for the study, namely previous engagement with our known institutional partner (an Uttarakhand-based environmental NGO). 10 We first conducted an exhaustive enumeration of all villages in two districts of UttarakhandBageshwar and Nainital-that had previously been targeted in a program implemented by a local 10 Pattanayak et al. (2009) present a step-by-step process of creating such a sample with an application to a similar environmental health program in rural India. King et al. (2007) describe a large-scale application of a similar approach in Mexico to evaluate the impacts of universal health insurance. development NGO. 11 In total, we identified 148 distinct villages lying in our NGO stratum, which we refer to as "NGO villages." Using data on community-level characteristics for these villages from the 2001 round of the Indian Census, we next applied propensity score matching to identify observationally similar "non-NGO villages" in which the NGO had not previously intervened (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984) . 12 The matching approach allows us to purposely select for variation within our institutional stratum, while maintaining similarity across the strata in terms of a large number of observable Census characteristics. In the first stage of this approach, we excluded any village with fewer than forty households from our sampling frame, and then estimated logistic regression models for the outcome of selection into a previous NGO intervention as a function of community-level Census variables. 13 In the first stage we find that, in general, NGO villages are slightly smaller and have proportionally more Scheduled Caste members than the average village (Appendix Table B1 ). 14 NGO villages are also more likely to have infrastructure or village-level institutions (schools, credit societies, and bus facilities), but are more remote (further away from large towns, and with lower access to paved roads and telephones) than non-NGO villages.
In the second stage, following the logit estimation, we estimated the probability of receiving a previous NGO intervention for all villages in our eligible districts. These predicted probabilities constitute the propensity score for each village. We matched NGO villages to non-NGO villages with the most similar propensity scores (allowing for replacement, and limiting matches to the support region with the greatest overlap in density of NGO and non-NGO villages). In this way, we ensured that the communities selected for our sampling frame were as similar as possible. For each model, we developed a matching routine that restricted our potential sample villages on the basis of size (greater than forty households) and distance from the base of operations for our survey (working in sub-districts that could be reached within one day). We next eliminated the worst ten percent of matches on the basis of propensity score distance-a process known as "trimming"-to ensure 11 The NGO leads activities related to agriculture and forestry (promotion of sustainable agricultural practices, sustainable fodder cultivation, and promotion of culinary herbs), health (local hospitals/clinics), education (local schools), village-level groups (self-help groups, youth groups, and vocational cooperatives), and water management (watershed renewal, and spring-water recharge).
12 Note that this does not mean that no NGO had ever worked in these villages-only that our local implementation partner had not. Our analyses, thus, focus on how relationships with particular implementing NGOs influence intervention effectiveness.
13 In total, we estimated three distinct specifications of these logit models. In the first specification of this model, we included sub-district (block) fixed effects, which helped restrict the set of controls to very local villages, and omitted variables that were frequently missing in the Census data (e.g., access to bus services, tap water, and/or electricity availability characteristics). The second specification dropped these sub-district fixed effects, whereas the third specification was similar to the second except that it included the additional controls (with missing values in the Census assumed to be zero, or omitted in the case of tap-water availability). We eliminated the second specification because it was clearly less robust to the distance restrictions for our sample, that is, fewer matches were preserved when dropping the sub-districts far away from our base of operations. We also found that the quality of matches on a number of variables was greatly reduced with inclusion of the sub-district-level controls used in the first specification. Thus, our final analysis is based on the third specification (see Appendix Figure A1 and Appendix Table B1 for additional details).
14 The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are various historically disadvantaged or indigenous groups in India that have received official recognition as such from the Indian government.
that pairs that are poor matches are not selected simply due to the inclusion of villages that do not happen to have good matches (Crump et al., 2009 ).
Finally, to draw our precise sample of matched pairs, we studied each of the individual pairs remaining after trimming in detail. Here, we paid particular attention to match quality and overall balance between the NGO and non-NGO strata with regards to key contextual factors (such as population, distance from nearby towns, and the presence of village-level groups and societies). Our final sample consisted of 38 villages (nineteen matched pairs of NGO and non-NGO villages). At the conclusion of our matching exercise, our matched pairs of NGO and non-NGO villages were balanced on all community-level characteristics used during our propensity-score estimation (Table 1) . 15
Sub-cluster survey samples and household surveys
Uttarakhand is one of India's least densely populated states, with terrain that gives rise to "subclusters" (geographically distinct hamlets known as toks) within villages. 16 These hamlets typically vary in terms of cultural and socio-economic characteristics. To maximize sample variation along these socio-economic lines we randomly selected between two and four hamlets within each matched village for our final sample. Specifically, we determined that our survey teams would work within at least two hamlets in small villages, at least three in medium villages, and at least four in large villages (owing to population differences across these three groups of villages). Our final sample consisted of 97 hamlets.
Households were randomly selected to participate in survey activities; baseline surveys occurred during the summer of 2012. 17 If household members were unavailable during the entire day of survey activities-or if they refused to participate-neighboring households were randomly selected as replacements. Field supervisors performed household introductions and obtained informed consent, recorded GPS coordinates and elevation data, and oversaw quality-control checks in each village. A random subsample of households was also selected for detailed weighing of daily solid-fuel use. 18
The ICS-promotion intervention (described in detail in Section 4.1) began in August 2013, with midline and endline surveys taking place around November 2013 and November 2014-the threeand fifteen-month marks, respectively.
15 Appendix Table B2 presents additional tests of cross-sectional balance using more detailed community-level data from the 2011 round of the Indian Census. We did not use this Census round for our matching exercise as it had only been released provisionally at the time. Nevertheless, we find that NGO and non-NGO villages are balanced across multiple dimensions using these data as well, particularly once we make adjustments to account for multiple hypothesis testing using the free step-down resampling methodology of Westfall and Young (1993) .
16 Topographically, Uttarakhand is characterized by "hilly terrain, rugged and rocky mountains, deep valleys, high peaks, swift streams and rivulets, rapid soil erosion, frequent landslides and widely scattered habitation" (Maurya, 2014) .
17 Highly variable village structures and geographic constraints created variation in the number of hamlets and households sampled in each village. A minimum of twenty surveys were completed in small villages, thirty in medium ones, and forty in large ones. If a village was divided into distinct geographical sub-units (e.g., half the village was to the north of the main road, while the other half was to the south), the target number of surveys was split equally among these groups.
18 This process involves asking households to collect an amount of fuelwood and other solid fuels that is slightly more than what they anticipate using over the next day. This amount is weighed by the field team, which returns approximately 24 hours later to weigh the remaining amount. Table 2 presents an overview of our main sample of 943 households, disaggregated by NGO and non-NGO villages. 19 The average household in our study consists of just under five members. The average household head is 54 years old, and has had approximately six years of formal education.
Descriptive statistics
Only about a quarter of surveyed households are headed by women, and more than half fall below the Indian poverty line.
As in many other parts of rural India, reliance on traditional stoves and fuels is practically universal. 20 In contrast, only about a third of households own any type of improved stove; this is almost exclusively limited to liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) stoves, which are typically owned by relatively wealthy households. Awareness of modern alternatives to traditional cooking technologies is low: only about a quarter to a third of households profess an awareness of the existence of stoves or fuels that produce less smoke. This is not necessarily due to a lack of awareness about the harms associated with exposure to household air pollution. Indeed, half of surveyed households believe that the smoke generated by their primary stove is unsafe. Households also report spending up to two hours per day on average collecting traditional fuels for household use. In addition, around one in five households report that at least one family member suffered from a case of cough or cold in the past two weeks. Together, this suggests that the welfare burden imposed by widespread reliance on traditional energy sources is substantial. Table 2 reveal that randomly selected households in NGO villages are broadly similar to their counterparts in non-NGO villages in terms of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics as well as in terms of stove ownership and use patterns. We note that NGO-village households are somewhat larger, report spending approximately thirty more minutes per day collecting traditional fuels, and report higher awareness of the existence of cleaner stoves and fuels. We control for these differences in all our analyses explicitly or via the inclusion of household fixed-effects.
Balance tests in

Empirical framework and identification strategy
Our empirical framework combines ex ante community-level matching (described in detail in Section 3) with a randomized intervention design and a quasi-experimental difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation approach for identification. In this section we (i) provide an overview of our experimental intervention; and (ii) outline our estimation and identification strategy.
Randomized ICS-promotion intervention design
Figure 1 presents an overview of our intervention design and implementation timeline. The intervention was randomized at the level of the hamlet; roughly seventy percent of hamlets-and, by implication, seventy percent of households-stratified across NGO and non-NGO villages were randomly assigned to the ICS-promotion treatment group prior to the start of the intervention in August 2013. As part of ICS-promotion efforts, treated households were visited by trained enumerators who identified themselves as affiliated with our partner NGO. Treated households received a personalized demonstration of two distinct ICS technologies: the Greenway biomass cookstove, and the G-Coil electric stove. At the end of the demonstration, survey teams presented these households with an offer to purchase one or both of the stoves. This offer consisted of a financial plan (the opportunity to make payments in three installments) combined with one of three randomized level of rebates (high, medium or low-representing a reduction in the cost of each stove by about two, twenty, and thirty percent, respectively). 21 These rebates were randomized at the household-level and delivered as a discount counting against the final installment payment if a household was found to be still using the stove by that time. Households in control hamlets did not receive the intervention; survey teams visited control households at the same time as treated households to conduct follow-up surveys.
This stratified study design enables us to compare the differential impact of the same randomized intervention delivered by the same field team professing to be affiliated with the same NGO across two institutionally distinct settings, namely, communities with which the NGO had a preexisting relationship and those with which it did not. This allows us to isolate how NGOs-and the trust and social capital they foster in their local communities-influences the outcomes of interventions directly.
Since our intervention is designed principally to increase uptake of cleaner cooking technologies, our main outcome of interest is the purchase rate of intervention ICS. To investigate heterogeneity in this rate across treated households located in NGO and non-NGO villages separately, we estimate the following specification:
where Y ij is a binary variable that equals one if household i in hamlet j purchased at least one of the two intervention ICS offered during intervention activities and zero if it did not; T REAT M EN T j is a binary variable that equals one if hamlet j is randomly assigned to the treatment group and zero if it is assigned to the control group; N GO j is a binary variable that equals one if hamlet j is located in an NGO-village and zero if it is in a non-NGO village; X i,n represents a set of household-level controls; and ij is a normally distributed error term. Our coefficient of interest is β 3 , which sheds light on the additional impact of the randomized ICS-promotion intervention on purchase rates in the NGO stratum of villages.
Difference-in-difference-in-differences specification
Although the villages across the NGO and non-NGO strata are matched on sixteen different community-level characteristics (Table 1) , one may still be concerned that unobservable communitylevel differences drive either the selection of NGOs into certain villages, the selection of households into villages in the NGO stratum, or both. Identification may be threatened, for instance, by an NGO-stratum-specific factor that affects households' responsiveness to the intervention. To address this concern, we leverage the multiple rounds of our survey in a difference-in-difference-in-differences ("triple-differences") specification. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
where Y ijt represents ICS-related adoption, use, or impact for household i in hamlet j in survey-round t. In Equation (20), P OST 1 and P OST 2 represent binary variables that are equal to one if data for the relevant observation were collected during the first and second follow-up survey rounds, respectively, and zero otherwise; these variables capture time trends over our multiple survey rounds.
We also include household fixed-effects (represented by γ i ) to control for unobserved household-level differences. 22 Our coefficients of interest are now β 11 and β 12 , which represent the additional impact of our intervention for treated households located in NGO villages relative to treated households located in non-NGO villages during the midline and endline survey rounds, respectively.
It is worth noting that the fully interacted triple-differences specification outlined in Equation (20) considerably relaxes our identifying assumptions. Identification would only be threatened by a confluence of factors, say, if hamlets in the treatment arm were located closer to urban areas; if NGO villages exhibited a greater degree of rural-to-urban migration (unobserved by us); and if the ICS-promotion intervention spanned a period that entailed a seasonal return of said (relatively cash-rich) urban migrants back to their homes-resulting in a time-varying shock specific to treated NGO-stratum hamlets that positively influenced households' purchase of ICS technologies. While certainly possible, we contend that this is unlikely in practice. Random allocation of hamlets to the intervention and control arms should preclude community-level characteristics in treated and untreated hamlets from differing significantly. In addition, our matching approach controls for a host of observed community-level differences between NGO-and non-NGO villages; the inclusion (and interaction) of survey-round time trends accounts for changes over time in hamlets in the intervention arm as a whole as well as in the NGO stratum specifically; and household fixed-effects soak up time-invariant unobservable differences. 23
Results and discussion
We now turn to a discussion of the results of our empirical analyses. Our main results focus on heterogeneity in the effectiveness of the ICS-promotion intervention across matched NGO and non-NGO settings. Although our intervention is not designed to evaluate the impact of ICS in real-world settings, as part of secondary analyses, we also investigate heterogeneity in impacts of ICS promotion on households' energy-use and time-allocation patterns across NGO and non-NGO communities.
Effectiveness of the intervention across NGO and non-NGO villages
Household-level purchase of intervention ICS technologies Our primary outcome of interest is household-level purchase of ICS technologies promoted during the ICS promotion intervention.
Figure 2 highlights the mean purchase rate for households located in treated hamlets in NGO and non-NGO villages. On average, nearly sixty percent of treated households in NGO villages purchase at least one of the two intervention ICS. In non-NGO villages, the corresponding figure is approximately 45 percent. We next evaluate this difference more rigorously in a linear regression framework. Table   3 presents our results. We find that the promotion campaign is extremely effective at encouraging the uptake of the intervention stoves; as shown in column (1), over half of targeted household purchase at least one of the two promoted ICS technologies. However, when we disaggregate our results by NGO and non-NGO villages following Equation (19) in column (2), we find that the purchase rate is nearly thirteen percentage points (28 percent) higher in treated hamlets located in NGO villages-a statistically significant and positive "NGO effect." 24 These results are robust to the inclusion of household-level controls that were found to be unbalanced at baseline in Table 2 , as shown in column (3).
23 Because we evaluate the impact of our ICS-promotion intervention using primary data collected during one baseline (pre-intervention) and two follow-up (post-intervention) survey rounds, we are unable to verify whether pre-intervention trends for our ICS-related adoption, use, and impact outcomes of interest are parallel across NGO and non-NGO villages. Instead, we test for differences in pre-trends across NGO and non-NGO villages for a host of community-level characteristics that are likely to be correlated with our outcomes of interest using the 2001 and 2011 rounds of the Indian Census. We find no evidence of differences in pre-trends across NGO and non-NGO villages over this period (Appendix Table B3 ).
24 In Appendix Figure A2 , we present results from the application of an approach inspired by randomization-based inferential procedures (Athey and Imbens, 2017) to village-level NGO stratum allocation. Our approach relies on randomly assigning villages to placebo NGO and non-NGO strata, and re-estimating Equation (19); this process is repeated 1,000 times to obtain a distribution of placebo "NGO effect" estimates. If the effect we observe were due to the chance selection of the villages in our NGO and non-NGO strata, we would expect to observe our actual estimate located near the middle of this distribution. Instead, we find that only three percent of these placebo estimates are greater in magnitude than our actual estimates. In addition, in Appendix C, rather than characterizing NGO and non-NGO villages using a binary variable, we characterize the village-specific "intensity" of NGO activity based on two different measures: (i) the number of projects/initiatives the NGO is implementing in a particular villages; and (ii) the number of years it has been active in a particular village. We use these two measures to separately re-estimate Equation (19) for heterogeneity in rates of ICS purchase and find that these analyses provide evidence that is consistent with our main results.
Ownership and use of intervention ICS This apparent "NGO effect" is not limited to the initial purchase decision. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3 highlight that ownership and reported use of intervention ICS remains higher in NGO villages over multiple survey rounds. To rigorously evaluate differences in these trends, we separately estimate the triple-differences specification outlined in Equation (20) for ownership and use of intervention ICS during the midline (three-month) and endline (fifteen-month) follow-up surveys. Our results are shown in Table 4 , which also includes results from estimating a double-differences specification without NGO-specific interactions for Ownership and use of improved stoves We next separately estimate Equation (20) for reported ownership and use of all improved stoves-and not only the two ICS promoted during the intervention.
Here, we aim to evaluate the effectiveness of our intervention more broadly. 26 Indeed, although we limited promotion activities to two specific ICS technologies, the primary goal of such an intervention-were it to be implemented as part of national or regional policies-would arguably be to increase reliance on cleaner, more efficient cooking technologies more generally. Understanding how institutional actors influence intervention effectiveness at this higher level is, thus, important.
As shown in Table 5 , we find that the differential adoption and use patterns associated with uptake of the intervention ICS in treated NGO hamlets (highlighted in Tables 3 and 4) do not appear to be related to adoption and use of improved stoves more broadly. Specifically, while the intervention is effective at increasing ownership and use of improved stoves in treated hamlets (columns 1 and 3, respectively), we detect no differential effect of the intervention between treated hamlets in NGO and non-NGO villages (columns 2 and 4). In fact, the negative coefficient for both of our triple-differences estimates hints at an underlying "technology substitution" effect-households that choose to purchase intervention ICS in treated NGO hamlets are those that might have adopted an improved stove in the absence of the intervention anyway. 27
25 That said, we are unable to reject that the difference between the two coefficients-for ownership of intervention ICS by households in treated NGO hamlets at midline and at endline-is statistically zero.
26 Recall that in addition to the two intervention ICS, "improved stoves" include kerosene burners, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and biogas stoves, as well as other electric or efficient biomass alternatives. In our study area, LPG stoves were the main improved alternative, owned by approximately a third of households at baseline.
27 Ownership and reported use of improved stoves at baseline (pre-intervention) is balanced across NGO and non-NGO hamlets (Figure 3 , panels c and d ), and baseline ownership of improved stoves does not predict subsequent At the same time, our results also highlight other NGO-related dynamics. Recall that the first and second follow-up surveys occurred approximately three and fifteen months after the start of ICS promotion activities, respectively. Given the concerted efforts of the Indian government in recent years to enhance access to cleaner cooking fuels and technologies-and LPG, in particular (Barnwal, 2017; Kumar et al., 2016 )-we would expect ownership of improved stoves to naturally increase over this period. In Equation (20), we control for these time trends by including dummy variables for both follow-up survey rounds. As part of our triple-differences specification, we also interact these variables with the NGO-village dummy, which allows us to separately control for NGO-village-specific time trends. With these controls, we find that only three months after the intervention, ownership and use rates of improved stoves in control hamlets in NGO villages (represented by the coefficient for N GO j × P OST 1 ) are nearly fifteen percentage points higher.
In the appendix, we attempt to shed light on these two phenomena by separately analyzing trends in ownership of the three most important types of improved stoves in our setting (LPG, electric, and efficient biomass stoves) across treatment/control and NGO/non-NGO communities. 28 Appendix Figure A3 suggests that changes in ownership of improved stoves in both NGO and non-NGO control hamlets are almost entirely driven by changes in ownership of LPG stoves. This trend is confirmed when we estimate Equation (20) for only LPG stoves, indicated by the near equality in magnitude of the coefficients on the N GO j × P OST 1 interaction term in columns (1) and (2) of Appendix Table B5 . In addition, we find that our intervention indeed appears to have lowered ownership of LPG stoves in treated NGO hamlets initially relative to treated non-NGO hamlets-as indicated by the negative coefficient on the T REAT M EN T j × N GO j × P OST 1 triple interaction term-in line with our "technology substitution" hypothesis.
The mechanisms that lead to households in control NGO communities adopting LPG stoves at these elevated rates are unclear. It may be the case that opportunities for households living in different hamlets to interact are higher in NGO villages. This could lead to information spillovers across treated and control hamlets within NGO villages that induce households in the latter to adopt relatively readily available LPG stoves. It could also be the case that our NGO partner-having gained experience implementing improved-stove interventions-began to enable households in its control communities to avail of the Indian government's LPG-promotion schemes. Indeed, it is only one year later at the second follow-up that we see non-NGO control communities (represented by the identical coefficient on P OST 2 in columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table B5 ) beginning to catch up in terms of ownership of LPG stoves, consistent with the expected spread of improved LPG technologies over time. While we are unable to speak definitively about these underlying dynamics, our stratified study design does allow us to see how our intervention may have crowded out improved energy-technology acquisition in treated hamlets with prior interaction with the NGO. Because the socioeconomic and environmental benefits associated with an intervention like ours ultimately depend on community-level uptake of improved stoves broadly, this NGO-specific crowding out also purchase of intervention ICS (Appendix Table B4 ), suggesting that intervention ICS are typically being purchased by households that did not already have an improved stove.
28 Recall that one of our two intervention ICS is an electric stove while the other is an efficient biomass stove.
has implications for intervention effectiveness.
Heterogeneity in impacts across NGO and non-NGO villages
Finally, we turn to an evaluation of the socioeconomic and environmental impacts of the ICS promotion with an eye to investigating heterogeneity in impacts across NGO and non-NGO villages. 29
Specifically, we separately estimate Equation (20) for an objective measure of daily fuelwood use and for reported time spent collecting fuels for household use per day.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 present our results for an objective measure of fuelwood use, obtained from a subsample of households that were randomly selected for weight-based measurements of their solid fuel use over a 24-hour period. 30 As shown in column (1), the intervention appears to reduce fuelwood use by approximately two kilograms per day in the relatively short run (as indicated by the negative estimated coefficients for T REAT M EN T j × P OST 1 ). However, our triple-differences estimate for the midline in column (2) reveals that this effect is almost entirely driven by reductions in fuelwood use by households in treated NGO hamlets. These household appear to use nearly three fewer kilograms of fuelwood per day-evidence of the "NGO effect" that is consistent with reported use of purchased intervention stoves. By the time of the endline survey one year later (that is, the coefficient on T REAT M EN T j × N GO j × P OST 2 ), this effect appears to attenuate somewhat, and we no longer detect a significant difference between fuelwood use in NGO-and non-NGO treated communities. That said, it is worth noting that we are unable to reject that the difference between the triple-differences estimates for the midline and endline survey rounds is zero.
Consistent with these fuelwood use patterns, in column (3) we find that while there is no detectable effect of the intervention on reported daily fuel-collection times for treatment hamlets in general, households in treated hamlets in NGO villages reported significant reductions in time spent collecting fuels for household uses at the time of the midline and endline follow-up surveys (column 4). This effect appears to be driven primarily by reductions in time spent collecting fuelwood and other traditional fuels (Appendix Table B6 ). Once again, the two triple-differences estimates are statistically indistinguishable from each other. 29 We note that our intervention was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of tools to promote the sale, adoption and use of ICS, and was not intended to evaluate ICS impacts in real-world settings. That said, our stratified design does allow us to investigate impact heterogeneity. , , Beyene et al. (2015) , Brooks et al. (2016) , Hanna et al. (2016) , Lewis et al. (2016) , Meeks et al. (2016) , and Somanathan and Bluffstone (2015) are some recent examples of evaluations of the economic, environmental, and health impacts of various non-traditional cooking technologies.
30 Households were instructed to set aside an amount of fuelwood they expected to use over the next 24-hour period. This amount was weighed by the field team, which returned the next day to reweigh the remaining amount. We underscore that the relatively involved nature of the fuel-weight test limited the available sample size and, consequently, our ability to detect meaningful impacts for this outcome variable.
Bayesian synthesis of the evidence
How do our findings contribute to the limited evidence on the roles NGOs play in shaping outcomes of interventions? To answer this question, our final set of analyses combines the insights from the implementer identity literature-which finds that NGO-led interventions are often more effective than comparable efforts by other actors-with the results of our matched-experimental study design in a simple Bayesian regression framework.
Suppose β 3 is a random variable that represents the true effect of the NGO on the outcomes of the ICS promotion intervention in our setting-the same term we use to indicate the coefficient on the T REAT M EN T j × N GO j interaction term in Equation (19). Our first step is to suitably characterize the prior evidence base for this parameter. For this, we focus on two existing randomized evaluations. First, we turn to Bold et al. (2016) , who evaluate a nationwide education reform in Kenya that expanded funding for hiring "contract teachers." Such teachers are hired directly by schools-typically at wages that are below those offered to tenured public school teachers-to address teacher shortages; they are also not accorded the same tenure protections available to their civil-service colleagues. There are a number of pathways through which contract teachers might improve educational outcomes. 31 Yet, as in many other cases, the evidence on the efficacy of such programs is from relatively small-scale interventions. As part of their large-scale evaluation, Bold et al. (2016) randomly assign a nationwide sample of public schools to a control group, and one of two treatment groups that differ only in the identify of the implementer-in one, the implementation is led by an NGO while in the other it is led by the government. They find that "an additional contract teacher in a school where the program is managed by the NGO increased test scores by roughly 0.18 standard deviations." In contrast, the treatment effect is both smaller and statistically insignificant in the government-implementation schools. Digging deeper into mechanisms, they also find that contract teachers were actually hired and in place for at least twelve percent more months in NGO-implementation schools over the course of the intervention.
We turn next to Cameron and Shah (2017) , who evaluate the scale-up of a community-led total sanitation (CLTS) intervention in the Indonesian province of East Java. Nearly one billion people engage in open defecation, partly due to a lack of access to improved sanitation facilities.
CLTS relies primarily on social pressures-rather than subsidies or grants-to encourage adoption of latrines and induce sustained behavior-change. 32 In addition to evaluating the impact of CLTS relative to a control group, Cameron and Shah (2017) investigate heterogeneity in impacts across treatment communities where implementation was carried out by different actors. Specifically, treated communities were nearly evenly split; implementation was led by government staff in one 31 Specifically, Bold et al. (2016) highlight three pathways: (i) contract teachers are typically hired from a wait-list of candidates for civil-service teaching appointments, and are thus similarly skilled and less expensive to hire; (ii) a "selection effect," whereby only relatively good teachers are retained over time as poor quality teachers do not have their contracts extended; and (iii) an "incentive effect," whereby the lack of permanent contracts introduces dynamic incentives to increase teaching effort.
32 Dickinson et al. (2015) , for instance, describe a village-level CLTS intervention in India that entailed a "walk of shame," defecation mapping, and fecal weighing-all designed to to invoke an emotional response about the ubiquity of defecation sites in and around rural communities.
half and by local non-governmental "resource agencies" in the other. 33 They find that households are over five percentage points more likely to build a latrine in communities where NGOs triggered the CLTS intervention-a 42 percent increase in the rate of latrine ownership relative to the mean in the control communities. Once again, the treatment effect is both smaller and statistically insignificant in the government-implementation communities.
While not perfectly analogous to our setting, a priori, the results in these two studies offer insights about the possible range of β 3 -the "NGO effect." A 42 percent increase in the size of the treatment effect-as found by Cameron and Shah (2017)-would translate in our setting into an increase in the ICS purchase rate by households in treated NGO hamlets of nearly twenty percentage points relative to the purchase rate across treated non-NGO hamlets. In contrast, the more conservative twelve percent estimate from Bold et al. (2016) would imply a difference in the purchase rate between treated NGO and non-NGO hamlets of closer to five percentage points. The midpoint of these two estimates is 12.5 percentage points. This prior information suggests that we use a prior distribution f (β 3 ) that assigns most of its probability to the interval (0.05, 0.20), and that the expected value of β 3 under f (β 3 ) be close to 0.125. We, therefore, represent our prior information about β 3 as follows:
The density of this prior distribution-a beta distribution with shape parameters α = 2 and With this prior specified, we fit a Bayesian multilevel mixed-effects model broadly corresponding to the specification outlined in Equation (19) to investigate heterogeneity in purchase rates across treated NGO and non-NGO hamlets (described in detail in Appendix D). 35 Our results are shown panel (a) of Figure 4 , where the solid line approximates the posterior distribution we obtain for β 3 .
33 While not technically randomized across implementers, the authors contend that no systematic process guided the selection of implementing teams. They also note that baseline village-and household-level characteristics are balanced across implementer arms.
34 Admittedly, the choice of the specific beta prior outlined in Equation (21) is somewhat subjective as any number of alternative distributions would satisfy our outlined mean-and interval-related criteria. We note that the relative dearth of related evidence that we might draw upon to examine the distribution of estimates in more detail contributes to this subjectivity. Given this constraint, we believe our specified prior distribution does a reasonable job of characterizing the existing evidence. In addition, we also test the robustness of our results to prior specification using both "weak" and "strong" prior distributional assumptions.
35 Multilevel models account for hierarchical structures within the data. In our case, households are located within hamlets that are part of villages, which themselves are in distinct NGO and non-NGO strata. These level-specific effects also vary randomly across levels based on specified prior distributions. To facilitate comparability with our main analyses-where we cluster our estimated standard errors at the level of the hamlet-we restrict the nested structure to the level of the hamlet. In addition, we specify diffuse ("uninformative") priors for all random model parameters besides our parameter of interest.
This distribution has less density in its tails and is more peaked, reflecting our updated beliefs given our specified prior and our data. The estimated posterior mean for β 3 is 0.124. The ninety percent "credible interval" (the range that has ninety percent posterior probability to contain the true effect) is between 0.034 and 0.24. This represents a seven to fifty percent increase approximately in the size of the treatment effect, respectively.
To test the robustness of this result to prior specification, we repeat our analysis two additional times with alternatively specified prior distributions. First, we assume that:
This normal distribution (centered at our estimated coefficient for β 3 from Table 3 ) is highly diffuse The resulting posterior mean for β 3 is 0.15. The ninety percent credible interval is (−0.01, 0.31). In addition, the posterior probability that the "NGO effect" is positive is 0.94.
Next, we assume that:
This distribution, in contrast, reflects relatively strong a priori beliefs that NGOs do not influence the outcomes of the interventions they implement. 36 Panel (c) of Figure 4 presents our results.
The resulting posterior mean for β 3 of 0.08 is expectedly diminished but remains positive. Indeed, the posterior probability that the "NGO effect" is positive is 0.87-relatively unaffected by the considerably stronger prior centered on zero (compared to the highly diffuse prior in panel b). The ninety percent credible interval is (−0.04, 0.19).
Our analyses, thus, demonstrate that the evidence for a large and positive effect of the NGO on the effectiveness of the ICS promotion intervention is relatively robust-even under strong prior distributional assumptions about the lack of such an effect. We also show how evidence from related research can be used to inform these distributional assumptions and guide causal inference.
Conclusion
Using data from an experimental intervention covering nearly 1,000 households across 97 geographically distinct hamlets in rural Uttarakhand, India, we highlight how NGOs influence the outcomes of applied interventions. We hypothesize that NGOs play an important role in reducing transaction costs, and can be vital for implementing environmental, health, and development policies in rural areas. To test this hypothesis, we rely on ex ante propensity score matching to develop a sample of observationally similar rural communities that are differentiated by prior exposure to a local NGO.
We then stratify an experimental intervention designed to promote improved cookstoves (ICS) on this institutional variable in order to identify heterogeneity in adoption, use, and impacts.
Our results indicate the presence of a significant and positive "NGO effect." Consistent with our model predictions, ICS purchase rates for households in treated hamlets located in "NGO villages" were nearly thirteen percentage points (28 percent) higher than for households in treated hamlets located in matched "non-NGO villages." Using a difference-in-difference-in-differences ("triple-differences") specification, we find an even larger NGO effect on ICS use in these communities:
households in such communities were up to sixteen percentage points more likely to have used an ICS, representing a fifty percent increase in the size of the treatment effect. Consistent with these patterns of ownership and use, households in villages with prior exposure to the NGO also exhibited reductions in daily fuelwood use and fuel-collection time; in contrast, we find no evidence of any impact of the intervention on energy-use patterns for treated households in non-NGO villages.
Although previous work has noted the presence of differential impacts across communities with and without NGO activity, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to rigorously examine how the presence of an effective local NGO-and the specific institutional context that represents-directly influences household decision-making and ultimately determines the effectiveness of interventions.
As such, our study begins to address a knowledge gap that has significant implications for the Notes. Panels (a) and (c) plot the share of households that own at least one of the two intervention ICS or an improved ICS, respectively, as a percentage of all (treated and untreated) sample households in the indicated stratum of villages. Panels (b) and (d) plot the subset of these households that report having used these devices in the week prior to the survey as a percentage of all (treated and untreated) sample households in the indicated stratum of villages. "Improved stove" includes stoves fueled by biogas, electricity, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), kerosene, and commercially available efficient biomass cookstoves; we also include the two ICS promoted as part of the promotion intervention in this definition. Error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals for the means. Baseline survey activities occurred approximately one year before the intervention; midline and endline surveys occurred approximately three and fifteen months, respectively, after the intervention (see Figure 1 ). Notes. Columns (1) and (3) show means for NGO and non-NGO villages, respectively, for each of the village-level variables from the 2001 round of the Indian Census used for our final propensity score matching exercise. Columns (2) and (4) show the respective standard errors for these means. Column (5) shows the normalized difference between the two means. † The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are various historically disadvantaged or indigenous groups in India that have received official recognition as such from the Indian government.
* p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Notes. This table presents baseline (pre-intervention) summary statistics for 943 households that are part of the final study sample. "Traditional stove" includes traditional braziers (angithi), clay stoves (mitti ka chulha), coal/fuelwood heaters (sagarh), pan-shaped coal stoves, and three-stone fires. "Improved stove" includes stoves fueled by biogas, electricity, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and kerosene, and commercially available efficient biomass cookstoves. "Traditional fuel" includes crop residue, dung, fuelwood, leaves, and household waste (trash). "Clean fuel" includes biogas, electricity (for cooking), kerosene, and LPG. Variables for time spent using traditional stoves per day and for time spent collecting traditional fuels per day are winsorized at the 97.5 percentile level. Missing values in variables for knowledge of stoves or fuels that produce less smoke are replaced with zero. p-values associated with differences in means (reported using asterisks in column 5) are obtained from a regression model of the form: Yij = β0 + β1 · 1 (NGO village) + ij , where Yij represents a household-level characteristic for household i in hamlet j; 1 (NGO village) represents an indicator that equals one if hamlet j is located in an NGO village, and ij represents a normally distributed error term. Standard errors are clustered at the hamlet level, and p-values are adjusted using the free step-down resampling methodology of Westfall and Young (1993) , as operationalized by Jones et al. (2018) . * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Notes. The outcome variable is an indicator that equals one if household i in hamlet j purchased at least one of the two ICS promoted during the intervention. Column (1) presents aggregated results; results are disaggregated by NGO and non-NGO villages (as shown in Equation 19) in column (2). Baseline household-level controls for household size, number of children under five, awareness of existence of cleaner stoves and fuels, and total traditional-fuel collection time per day are included in column (3). "Traditional fuel" includes crop residue, dung, fuelwood, leaves, and household waste (trash); missing observations for total time spent collecting traditional fuel for 32 households are replaced with the sample mean value. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the hamlet level. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Notes. The outcomes variables are ownership (columns 1-2) and use (columns 3-4) of at least one of the two intervention ICS as measured during baseline, and midline and endline follow-up surveys (conducted approximately three and fifteen months after the start of the intervention, respectively). The outcome variable for ownership is an indicator that equals one if household i in hamlet j reports owning at least one of the two ICS promoted during the intervention in survey round t; for use, it is an indicator that equals one if the household-conditional on ownership-reports having used at least one of these two ICS in the past week. The even-numbered columns present the results of estimating the triple-differences specification outlined in Equation (20). The accompanying odd-numbered columns present results from estimating a double-differences specification without NGO-specific interactions for comparison. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the hamlet level. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Notes. The outcome variables are ownership (columns 1-2) and use (columns 3-4) of all improved stoves as measured during baseline, and midline and endline follow-up surveys (conducted approximately three and fifteen months after the start of the intervention, respectively). The outcome variable for ownership is an indicator that equals one if household i in hamlet j reports owning at least one improved stove in survey round t; for use, it is an indicator that equals one if the household-conditional on ownership-reports having used such a device in the past week. The even-numbered columns present the results of estimating the triple-differences specification outlined in Equation (20). The accompanying odd-numbered columns present results from estimating a double-differences specification without NGO-specific interactions for comparison. "Improved stove" includes stoves fueled by biogas, electricity, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), kerosene, and commercially available efficient biomass cookstoves; we also include the two ICS promoted as part of the promotion intervention in this definition. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the hamlet level. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Notes. The outcome variables are daily fuelwood use (columns 1-2) and total time spent collecting fuels (columns 3-4) as measured during baseline, and midline and endline follow-up surveys (conducted approximately three and fifteen months after the start of the intervention, respectively). Daily fuelwood use is derived from a 24-hour before-after household-level fuel-weighing test; we restrict the analysis in columns (1) and (2) to the subsample of households that participated in such tests in at least two of our three survey rounds (N = 388). The outcome variable for fuel-collection time is derived from self-reported data on time spent (per day, week, or month) collecting fuelwood, crop residue, leaves, dung, biomass pellets, kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), biogas, and-if relevant-any other fuel used by the household; missing observations for time spent collecting fuel for up to six households in each survey round are replaced with the survey-round-specific sample mean value. The even-numbered columns present the results of estimating the triple-differences specification outlined in Equation (20). The accompanying odd-numbered columns present results from estimating a double-differences specification without NGO-specific interactions for comparison. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the hamlet level. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Figure A2 : Randomization-based inferential procedure applied to village-level stratum allocation
Notes. This figure plots the distribution of 1,000 estimated β3 coefficients from a randomization inference procedure (Athey and Imbens, 2017) applied to village-level NGO stratum allocation to estimate Equation (19). We randomly assign each village in the sample to placebo NGO and non-NGO strata, and estimate the specification presented in column (3) of Table 3 to obtain a placebo "NGO effect" estimate for heterogeneity in purchase of intervention ICS. This procedure is repeated 1,000 times to obtain a distribution of placebo effects. The vertical line indicates the magnitude of our actual estimated "NGO effect." Approximately three percent of placebo estimates are larger than the actual estimated effect (shaded area).
Figure A3: Trends in ownership of selected improved stoves
Notes. This figure presents mean ownership rates of all improved stoves as well as LPG, electric and improved biomass variants separately for treatment/control and NGO/non-NGO communities during each survey round. "Improved stove" in panel (a) includes stoves fueled by biogas, electricity, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), kerosene, and commercially available efficient biomass cookstoves; we also include the two ICS promoted as part of the promotion intervention in this definition. Electric stoves (panel c) and efficient biomass stoves (panel d ) include the respective ICS promoted as part of the promotion intervention. Error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals for the means. Baseline survey activities occurred approximately one year before the intervention; midline and endline surveys occurred approximately three and fifteen months, respectively, after the intervention (see Figure 1 ). Notes. Column (1) presents the estimated β1 coefficients for the specified Census outcome variable from a regression model of the form:
Appendix B Additional tables
where Yi represents a village-level characteristic for village i in the 2011 Census round, 1 (NGO village) represents an indicator for whether our partner NGO had operated in village i in the past, and it represents a normally distributed error component. Column (2) shows the corresponding p-value-derived from heteroskedasticity robust standard errors-associated with each estimated coefficient. Column (3) shows p-values obtained using the free step-down resampling methodology of Westfall and Young (1993) , as operationalized by Jones et al. (2018) . LPG = liquefied petroleum gas. The unit of analysis is the Census-designated village (N = 38). * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. (1) is an indicator that equals one if household i in hamlet j reports owning at least one improved stove in survey round t; the results reported in column (1) are identical to those reported in column 2 of Table 5 . Similarly, as in Table 5 , "improved stove" includes stoves fueled by biogas, electricity, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), kerosene, and commercially available efficient biomass cookstoves; we also include the two ICS promoted as part of the promotion intervention in this definition. In column (2), the outcome variable is an indicator that equals one if household household i in hamlet j reports owning an LPG stove. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the hamlet level. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Notes. The outcome variable for fuel-collection time in column (1) is derived from self-reported data on time spent (per day, week, or month) collecting fuelwood, crop residue, leaves, dung, biomass pellets, kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), biogas, and-if relevant-any other fuel used by the household; the results in column (1) are identical to those presented in column (4) of Table 6 . In column (2), fuel-collection time is restricted to only traditional fuels (fuelwood, crop residue, leaves and and dung). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the hamlet level. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
Appendix C Redefining "NGO village"
There is often considerable spatial heterogeneity in the scale and scope of an NGO's activities. The same NGO can be deeply invested in the welfare of one particular community while at the same time only superficially involved with another. If this is the case in our setting, our characterization of NGO and non-NGO villages using a binary variable may be too crude. We, therefore, turn to two additional ways of defining the level of an NGO's involvement with each our study villages: (i) the number of activities it is leading in a particular community; and (ii) the number of years since it first began operating there. We obtain information on spatial variation in the NGO's portfolio of activities through reviews of its annual reports, newsletters, and other promotional materials. 37 Specifically, we rely on these materials to identify which activities occur in which villages, and when the NGO's operations first began there. This presents challenges as these promotional documents are typically not sufficiently detailed to allow us to comprehensively construct both measures. Recall that our sample contains 38 villages, of which half are NGO villages. In total, we are able to construct a detailed breakdown of the NGO's activities in twelve of its nineteen villages; we are able to identify the NGO's commencement year in an equal number of villages. A count of projects among these villages with non-missing implementation data reveals that the NGO leads just over four initiatives (with a minimum of one and maximum of seven) in each of its villages. Similarly, immediately prior to the start of the intervention, the NGO has been operating for just over fifteen years in the average village, ranging from four years in the newest village to 25 years in the oldest one.
Using these additional measures (i.e., a count of the number of the NGO's active projects, and the overall age of its engagement in each village) we can investigate heterogeneity in purchase of intervention ICS-now across villages with relatively different "intensities" of NGO activity. We account for uncertainty introduced by missing data through a simulation-based bootstrap. Specifically, let NGO = NGO obs ∪ NGO miss , where NGO represents our data (on the village-specific count of NGO projects or the age of its engagement there) and NGO obs and NGO miss represent nonoverlapping observed and missing components of it, respectively. For each bootstrap simulation n ∈ N , we then proceed as follows: In other words, for villages lacking data on the count of projects, we replace missing count observations with random draws from a uniform distribution over the interval lying between the minimum (i.e., zero in non-NGO villages) and maximum (seven) number of projects observed in each village in our data. For villages lacking data on the age of NGO engagement, we similarly replace missing observations with random draws from a uniform distribution over the interval lying between the minimum (zero in non-NGO villages) and maximum (25) ages in our data. Having replaced these missing observations, we sample hamlets (with replacement) from our study sample to generate a bootstrapped sample, and separately estimate the specification outlined in Equation (19) by replacing our NGO binary variable with the count of NGO activities or the age of NGO engagement. For each specification, we repeat this process 10,000 times to obtain a distribution of the estimated coefficient for the T REAT M EN T j × N GO j interaction term. We note that this is a relatively conservative approach to dealing with the uncertainty surrounding missing observations. It is almost certainly the case that the NGO has active projects in each of its villages, and has operated in them for at least a few years. Nevertheless, the uniform distributions we use to replace missing observations have positive support over zero (the value these variables are assigned for non-NGO villages). In addition, our randomly generated replacements never exceed the maximum value observed in the (non-missing) data.
Figure C1 presents our results. As shown in panel (a), we find that purchase rates by households in treated NGO hamlets are, on average, approximately two percentage points higher for every additional project that the NGO leads in that particular village. This result is statistically significant at the ten percent level, as measured by the ninety percent confidence interval of the distribution of our simulated regression coefficients. Similarly, panel (b) shows that every additional year of the NGO's presence in a village resulted in an increase in rates of ICS purchase by households in treated NGO hamlets by just under one percentage point. Broadly, these results serve as a robustness check for our main result (Table 3) . They are also consistent with our model and show that NGO activity-defined in a variety of ways-influences the effectiveness of interventions. Figure C1 : Heterogeneity in ICS purchase rates based on alternative definitions of "NGO village"
Notes. This figure plots the distribution of 10,000 β3 coefficients obtained from estimating Equation (19) using a simulation-based bootstrap approach. This coefficient represents the additional impact of the ICS promotion intervention on ICS purchase rates in treated hamlets located in villages with relatively higher levels of NGO activity. In panel (a), the NGO activity variable is a count of the number of active projects being implemented by the NGO in each village; in non-NGO villages, this variable equals zero. In panel (b), the NGO activity variable is the number of years since the NGO first began operating in each village; once again, in non-NGO villages, this variable equals zero. The outcome variable is an indicator that equals one if household i in hamlet j purchased at least one of the two ICS promoted during the intervention.
Appendix D Bayesian analysis
We complement our main analyses using Bayesian methods. Standard frequentist approaches assume that underlying statistical parameters are fixed. Conditional on these fixed parameters, the data are one realization of infinitely many samples, and can be combined with assumptions about large-sample approximations (e.g., asymptotic normality) for inference. In contrast, Bayesian techniques assume that the true values of parameters are random variables, and assign distributions to these parameters based on a priori information. Conditional on the observed data and the specified prior distribution, a posterior distribution for each parameter can be estimated and used for inference.
D.1 Likelihood
We specify our likelihood function for the data as follows:
where Y ij is a binary variable that equals one if household i in hamlet j purchased at least one of the two intervention ICS offered during intervention activities and zero if it did not; T REAT M EN T j is a binary variable that equals one if hamlet j is randomly assigned to the treatment group and zero if it is assigned to the control group; and N GO j is a binary variable that equals one if hamlet j is located in an NGO-village and zero if it is in a non-NGO village. In addition, we include hamlet-specific random effects, represented by each of the γ j terms with coefficients u j . Notes. The outcome variable is an indicator that equals one if household i in hamlet j purchased at least one of the two ICS promoted during the intervention. Columns (1) and (2) presents the mean and standard deviations, respectively, for the MCMC sample. Column (3) presents the 95 percent interval for the MCMC sample. Estimates for 97 hamlet-specific random effects not reported for brevity. As in Table 3 , N = 943 households.
D.2 Priors
